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This paper develops an analytical model to quantify the costs and distributional effects of various fiscal
options for allocating the (large) rents created under prospective cap-and-trade programs to reduce
domestic, energy-related CO2 emissions. The trade-off between cost effectiveness and distribution
is striking. 
The welfare costs of different policies, accounting for linkages with the broader fiscal system, range
from negative $6 billion/year to $53 billion/year in 2020, or between minus $12 to almost $100 per
ton of CO2 reductions! The least costly policy involves auctioning all allowances with revenues used
to cut proportional income taxes, while the most costly policies involve recycling revenues in lump-sum
dividends or grandfathering emissions allowances. The least costly policy is regressive, however, while
the dividend policy is progressive, and grandfathering permits is both costly and regressive. A distribution-neutral
policy entails costs of $18 to $42 per ton of CO2 reductions.
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  One of the most important issues in the design of domestic, market-based climate policy 
is what to do with the rents or revenues created under cap-and-trade or emissions tax systems.
1 
How these policy rents are allocated and used critically affects not only the distributional impacts 
of the policy, but also its overall cost-effectiveness.  
  There are many ways to allocate policy rents. One is to grandfather allowances in a cap-
and-trade  system,  that  is,  give  them  away  free  to  existing  sources,  typically  based  on  their 
historical  emission  rates.  The  main  motivation  for  this  approach  is  political—providing 
compensation for producers affected by the regulation may make it easier to move legislation 
forward. Almost all of the allowances in the US program to cap SO2 emissions from power 
plants were given away for free and similarly in the initial phases of the European Union’s CO2 
trading program. However, more recent European and US federal climate initiatives have moved 
away  from  full  grandfathering,  as  it  is  widely  appreciated  that  this  approach  substantially 
overcompensates emitters for their compliance costs.
2  
  More recently, the distributional concern in the United States has been on the household 
side,  particularly  insulating  low-income  households  from  the  prospective  increase  in  energy 
prices from climate policy. Some proposals involve granting free allowances to local distribution 
companies with the expectation that the value of these allowances will be rebated to households 
in the form of lower electricity bills. Another approach that has recently gained traction is known 
as “cap-and-dividend”, which involves a cap-and-trade program with full allowance auctions 
with all the revenue returned in equal lump-sum transfers for all individuals. An argument for 
this approach is that all individuals have equal ownership rights to the environment and therefore 
proceeds from charging for use of the environment should be shared equally.  
  A  key  drawback  of  both  of  these  approaches  is  that  they  forgo  the  potentially  large 
efficiency gains from using allowance auction revenues to cut other distortionary taxes. Personal 
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1 O t h e r  ke y  i ss u e s  i n cl u d e  t h e  o v e ra ll  st r i n g e nc y  o f  t he  po l i c y,  it s  s ec t o r al  c o v e r a ge  ( i nc l u d i n g  p r o v i si o n s  f o r  
emission  offsets),  whether  cap-and-trade  should  include  price  stabilization  mechanisms,  and  to  what  extent 
supplementary instruments are warranted to address other possible market failures (e.g., technology spillovers). For 
a general discussion of these issues see, for example, Aldy et al. (2010).  
 
2 Power companies in the European Union earned large windfall profits when the CO2 cap was first introduced (e.g., 
Sijm et al., 2006). At least for a moderately scaled CO2 permit system, only about 15-20 percent of allowances are 
needed  to  compensate  energy  intensive  industries  for  their  loss  of  producer  surplus,  so  the  huge  bulk  of  the 
allowances could still be auctioned (e.g., Bovenberg and Goulder, 2001, Smith et al., 2002). 
 2 
income and other taxes distort capital and labor markets by depressing net factor returns. They 
also  distort  household  consumption  decisions  by  allowing  exemptions  or  deductions  for 
particular types of spending (e.g., employer medical insurance). Therefore, using revenues to 
lower  the  rates  of  these  distortionary  taxes  produces  gains  in  economic  efficiency  that  can 
substantially lower the overall welfare costs of climate policy (though this approach may do little 
to  help  with  distributional  objectives).  In  fact,  without  this  counteracting  revenue-recycling 
effect, the welfare costs of market-based climate policies are substantially higher in the presence 
of distortionary taxes, because those distortions raise production costs and product prices, and 
thereby lower real factor returns and factor supply (e.g., Goulder et al., 1999, Fullerton and 
Metcalf, 2001).  
To date, no climate bills have been introduced in the US Congress that would use policy 
revenues to reduce marginal income tax rates, though some include uses that would have similar 
effects.
3 Moreover, considering this case helps clarify the quite striking trade-offs involved in 
allocating climate policy rents. 
 In this paper, we develop and parameterize an analytical general-equilibrium model that 
synthesizes two different strands in the literature on domestic climate policy, one focusing on the 
cost-effectiveness of alternative market-based policies in a homogeneous agent framework and 
the  other  that  looks  at  distributional  effects  in  multi-agent  models  but  with  no  attention  to 
efficiency. While some of our results—such as the low cost-effectiveness of cap-and-dividend 
and grandfathered permits—have been recognized for some time, our analysis offers a more 
complete picture of efficiency/distributional trade-offs than can be gleaned from prior literature.
4  
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3 The Waxman-Markey, bill for example, devotes a portion of revenue to deficit reduction. If that deficit reduction 
would  otherwise  have  been  accomplished  by  raising  marginal  rates,  then  this  would  have  the  same  effect  as 
lowering marginal rates. In addition, a bill sponsored by Rep. Larson (HR 1337) would have used revenues to 
exempt a portion of income from payroll taxes. While this form of recycling would increase the return to labor force 
participation it would be less efficient than cutting marginal income tax rates. The latter would also increase effort 
on the job and reduce the bias towards tax-preferred spending. CO2 taxes which are largely revenue neutral have 
been implemented in British Columbia and in Scandinavian countries, though a tax proposal for France (with very 
limited coverage) was recently ruled unconstitutional.  
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4 Prior analyses by Burtraw et al. (2009), Dinan and Rogers (2002), and Parry (2004) have studied the distributional 
impacts of various options for recycling climate policy revenues through the tax system. And many papers have 
been written on the linkages between environmental policies and the broader tax system and how these affect the 
overall costs of policy (see, for example, Goulder et al., 1999, Fullerton and Metcalf, 2001, Bovenberg and Goulder, 
2002, and Schöb, 2006, among many others).  
Our analysis is more than just the sum of findings from these two literatures, however. Most importantly, 
the efficiency and distributional results come from the same model, and thus are directly comparable. This model 
has several additional  advantages. Unlike  in most prior  literature we  account for broader distortions of the tax 3 
Our analysis considers three bounding cases for rent allocation and use under cap-and-
trade systems. These include full grandfathering of allowances; full auction of allowances with 
revenues  returned  in  lump-sum-transfers;  and  full  auctions  with  revenues  recycled  in  equal, 
proportionate cuts in marginal income taxes across all household groups. We also consider a 
“distribution  neutral”  policy  where  the  tax  and  benefit  system  is  adjusted  to  neutralize  any 
distributional  effects  of  the  cap-and-trade  policy  on  households,  leaving  the  overall  policy 
change neither progressive nor regressive. Policymakers are more likely to choose combinations 
of the bounding cases studied here, rather than using 100 percent of rents for one purpose alone, 
however the implications of these combinations are easily inferred by taking the appropriate 
weighted averages of our bounding cases. Furthermore, although our discussion is couched in 
terms  of  cap-and-trade,  each  cap-and-trade  variant  has  an  emissions  tax  counterpart  in  our 
analysis.
5 
New revenue sources might be used in many ways other than those studied here. These 
run the gamut from program enhancing measures like clean technology programs, incentives for 
energy efficiency, and capacity investments to facilitate adaptation to climate change, to general 
increases  in  public  spending  and  federal  deficit  reduction.  However,  it  is  difficult  to  make 
general statements about the potential efficiency implications from these broader alternatives for 
revenue  use,  without  specific  evidence  on  the  benefit  and  costs  of  the  spending  measures, 
accounting  for  possible  market  failures  that  they  might  address.  Even  the  effects  of  deficit 
reduction are opaque, as it is unclear whether lower debt burdens for future generations will lead 
to lower taxes or more public spending.  
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system beyond those in factor markets, so we can integrate empirical findings from recent public finance literature 
on the taxable income elasticity (see below). Furthermore, our distributional analysis takes into account implicit 
burdens on households from the changes in deadweight loss from the broader fiscal system. Moreover, we account 
for inflation indexing of the tax/benefit system, which provides some (albeit limited) automatic adjustment to higher 
energy  prices.  In  addition,  the  type  of  multi-agent  model  used  here  is  needed  to  avoid  aggregation  bias  when 
households  face  different  tax  rates,  benefit  differently  from  revenue-recycling  schemes,  and  have  different 
behavioral responses to tax changes. Finally, the distribution-neutral approach described below has not previously 
been analyzed in the context of carbon policy. 
 
5 For example, a carbon tax with revenues returned in lump-sum transfers to firms in proportion to their historical 
emissions  would  be e q u i v a l e n t  t o  c a p -and-trade  with  grandfathered  allowances.  The  tax  and  cap-and-trade 
approaches would differ if our analysis were extended to incorporate uncertainty over future emissions abatement 
costs (e.g., Pizer, 2003).  
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  We find that the allocation of rents under cap-and-trade (or use of revenues under carbon 
taxes) can have huge efficiency and distributional consequences for carbon policy, effects that 
can be much larger than the direct effects of the carbon policy itself.  
Within the range of options we consider, the direct cost of reducing CO2 emissions to 9% 
below business-as-usual levels in the year 2020 is $9 billion (all figures are in year 2007 $). 
However, the overall welfare costs of different policies, taking into account linkages with the 
broader  fiscal  system,  ranges  from  negative  $6  billion/year  to  $53  billion/year.  In  terms  of 
average cost of CO2 reductions this is a huge range—from minus $12 to almost $100 per ton.  
The distribution of that cost ranges from highly progressive (with the bottom two income 
quintiles bearing a negative burden) to highly regressive (with the top two quintiles bearing a 
negative burden). There are stark trade-offs between cost-effectiveness and distribution in the 
design of market-based climate control policies. A cap-and-dividend approach makes carbon 
policy more progressive at the expense of dramatically raising the overall cost, and conversely, 
using revenue to fund a proportional income tax cut lowers overall cost but leads to a regressive 
distribution of those costs. A distribution-neutralizing tax change represents a middle ground for 
both efficiency and distributional effects. Cap-and-trade with grandfathered allowances performs 
poorly on both cost and distributional grounds, though it may reduce industry opposition and 
thus be more politically feasible.  
  The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  develops  our  analytical 
framework  and  key  formulas  for  the  efficiency  cost  and  distributional  burden  of  different 
policies. Section 3 describes the model parameterization. Section 4 presents the main quantitative 
findings and sensitivity analysis. Section 5 offers concluding remarks. 
 
2. Analytical Framework 
A. Model Assumptions 
We use a long run, comparative static model with multiple agents, each representing an 
average over all households within a particular income class. Households choose consumption of 
general goods, products that are energy intensive, products that receive favorable treatment from 
the  tax  system,  and  labor  supply.  The  government  prices  carbon  dioxide  (CO2)  emissions, 
through a cap-and-trade system, which in turn  drives up energy costs and product prices in 5 
general. Rents created by climate policy may accrue to the private sector (e.g., through free 
allowance allocation) or to the government. In the latter case, revenues are used to adjust the 
income tax and transfer system.  
 
(i) Household utility. We divide households into 5 equal-sized income groups, indexed by i, 
where i = 1 and 5 denote the lowest and highest income quintiles, respectively. Each group is 
modeled as a single representative household, with the utility function: 
(1)  ui(XiE,XiF,XiC,Li,G
PUB) 
XiE denotes consumption of an aggregate of goods whose production or use is energy intensive 
(e.g., electricity-using durables, auto travel, home heating fuels). XiF is consumption of goods 
that are favored through the broader tax system, such as employer-provided medical insurance or 
owner-occupied housing. XiC is an aggregate of all other (non-energy-intensive, non-tax-favored) 
goods. Li is work effort, implicitly combining labor force participation rates and average hours 
worked on the job by households in that group. G
PUB is government spending on public goods, 
which is fixed, and is included only to scale income tax rates to their observed levels. ui is quasi-
concave, twice differentiable, decreasing in labor supply, and increasing in all other arguments. 
 
(ii) Household budget constraint. The household budget constraint is given by:
  
(2)  pjXij
j ! = Ii
 
where j = E, F, C indexes the three goods and pj is the market price of good j.  
The tax and transfer system, reflecting state and federal personal income taxes, employer 
and employee payroll taxes, and sales taxes, minus government transfers, is represented as a 
piecewise-linear function with five segments and each of the five income groups falling on a 
different segment. For simplicity, we assume that any policy-induced changes in taxable income 
will be sufficiently small that no group will move to a different segment of the tax schedule. 
Under this assumption, the tax schedule group i faces is equivalent to a linear tax with rate ti  and 
intercept !Gi (which can be found by extending the relevant segment of the piecewise-linear tax 
schedule out to a point with zero pre-tax income). Disposable income (Ii) consists of taxable 
income (!i ), net of taxes paid on that income. This gives 
 6 
(3a)  Ii = (1! ti)"i + Gi  
 
Taxable income consists of the wage wi times labor supply, plus lump-sum net-of-tax 
profit income πi, less spending on tax-favored goods. Profit income accrues to households via 
their ownership of firms and reflects any producer rents created by cap-and-trade policy.  
 
(3b)  !i = wiLi +"i # pFXiF 
 
The (pre-existing) tax system causes two sources of distortion. First, it distorts labor 
supply by depressing the returns to work effort. Second, it creates a bias towards tax-preferred 
spending. The combined effect of carbon policies on these two distortions can be summarized by 
changes in taxable income.
6 
 
(iii) Production, CO2 emissions, prices and rents. All goods are produced under constant returns 
to scale under perfect competition (hence there are no pure profits in the absence of carbon 
policy). Market prices of goods, which implicitly incorporate any energy costs associated with 
their use, are determined by: 
(4)  pj = !jpH + "j 
Here ρj is the energy intensity of good j, where!E > !C,!F ; pH is the price of energy; and !j is a 
parameter representing non-energy costs.
7  
The price of energy is determined as follows  
(5)  pH = c(z
0 ! z)+"z + pH
0  
where z is CO2 emissions per unit of energy, c(.) is a positive, convex abatement cost function 
(c(0) = 0) and a superscript 0 denotes the initial value of a variable (prior to the introduction of 
carbon policy). A reduction in z represents a switch to lower carbon but more expensive fuels in 
energy production (e.g., a switch from coal to renewables or nuclear power). Emissions are 
priced at rate τ, which reflects the allowance price. Our assumptions also imply that emissions 
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6 W e  i m p l i c i t l y  a s s u m e  t h a t  that  tax  preferences  do  not  address  any  market  failures,  and  thus  are  purely 
distortionary.  
 
7 For simplicity ρj is taken as fixed though relaxing this would not affect the results, given our parameterization 
below. 7 
prices and abatement costs will be fully passed through into energy prices. As discussed below, 
this assumption is debatable, although it does not affect the key focus of our paper, which is the 
trade-off between costs and distributional goals in allowance allocation.  
Economy-wide CO2 emissions, Z, are the product of the emissions intensity of energy and 
energy use aggregated over all products and households: 
(6)  Z = z !j
j " Xij
i "  
For simplicity, we focus on a policy covering CO2 only, which accounts for about 80 percent of 
total US greenhouse gases. In addition, the (energy-related domestic) CO2 reductions, and the 
emissions  price,  are  approximately  consistent  with  those  projected  under  recent  climate 
legislation.
8 
  Profit income to household group i is given by: 
(7)  !i ="i#$Z    
!i is the fraction of (economy-wide) energy capital owned by household group i (implicitly, this 
includes both retirement and non-retirement bond and stockholdings), where  !i"i =1 and !i  is 
larger for higher income groups. ! is the portion of policy rents that are left in the private sector, 
as opposed to accruing to the government in revenue. ! = 0 represents a cap-and-trade system 
with  full  allowance  auctions.  ! =  1  represents  a  system  with  100  percent  free  allowance 
allocation to energy firms, where entire policy rents τZ are reflected in higher firm equity values 
and stockholder wealth, and such income is not taxed. Intermediate cases might represent partial 
taxation of allowance rents or partial auctioning of allowances. Outcomes for these cases are 
easily inferred by taking weighted averages of the results below.    
 
(iv) Government Constraints and Policy. The government is subject to the budget constraint 
(8)  G
PUB = ti !"i # Gi + (1#$)%Z
i &
i &   
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8  Although  under  current  legislation  firms  may  purchase  offsets  in  other  domestic  sectors  (e.g.,  forestry  and 
agriculture) and in other countries we do not count those as part of the emission reduction, nor do we include the 
deadweight  losses (in other sectors or countries) associated with those broader reductions. A key concern with 
offsets is the difficulty of verifying whether or not these broader emission reductions would have occurred anyway, 
and whether they might be negated through increased emissions elsewhere (e.g., slowed deforestation in one country 
might accelerate deforestation in other countries through a rise in global timber prices). 
 8 
This  constraint  requires  that  spending  on  public  goods  equals  revenue  from  the  income  tax 
system, plus revenue from the carbon policy.  
  Following the introduction of a carbon policy, the intercept terms in the tax schedule are 
adjusted as follows: 
(9)  Gi = Gi
0p + ˆ Gi ,  p = µj








where  we  have  normalized  all  initial  product  prices  to  unity.  pis  the  general  price  level,  a 
weighted average of market prices where the weight  µj  is the (initial) share of economy-wide 
spending (or consumption) on good j.  
According to (9), the nominal tax schedule is automatically “inflation-indexed” to reflect 
increases in the general price level (this implies that marginal and average tax rates depend on 
real income). In addition, some schemes devote a portion of the new revenues to making the 
policy more progressive, which implies an additional adjustment  ˆ Gi to transfer payments.  
  More specifically, we consider four bounding cases for the allocation/use of policy rents 
(each defined for the same emissions reduction/emissions price): 
Proportional income tax cut (! = 0 , ˆ Gi = 0). In this case, all policy rents go to the government 
and,  after  indexing  the  nominal  tax  schedule,  all  other  revenue  is  used  to  finance  an  equal 
reduction in the marginal tax rate faced by all income groups, that is,dti / d! = dt / d! < 0,"i .  
Cap and dividend (! = 0 , ˆ Gi = ˆ G > 0). For this policy, allowances under a cap-and-trade policy 
are  fully  auctioned  with  revenues  (after  indexing)  returned  in  equal  lump-sum  transfers  to 
households. 
Grandfathered  permits (! =1, ˆ Gi = 0).  Here  all  allowances  are  given  away  for  free  and  all 
policy rents accrue to households through their ownership of firms. (Again, we abstract from 
taxation of rents). 
Distribution-neutral (! = 0 , ˆ Gi ! 0). Whereas the tax change in the proportional tax cut case 
entails the same change to all marginal tax rates, the distribution-neutral case requires changing 
marginal income tax rates by different amounts at different points in the income distribution, in 9 
order to equalize the net burden as a percentage of income across all quintiles.
9 The efficiency 
gains from revenue recycling are smaller in the distribution-neutral case than in the case with 
proportional tax rate reductions. This occurs primarily because marginal rates fall by less in this 
case than in the proportional tax cut case. Cutting tax rates on low income groups leads to a 
relatively large drop in tax revenue, because all higher income groups also benefit from the rate 
reductions for the lower income brackets. Consequently, a tax cut disproportionately targeted at 
lower income groups will yield a smaller reduction in marginal rates than would a proportional 
tax cut. 
In all four cases we assume that any indirect revenue losses are made up through equal, 
proportionate adjustments to all marginal income tax rates.
10 These losses stem from reductions 
in taxable income as households, for example, reduce labor supply in response to lower real 
wages as higher energy prices drive up the general price level.  
One noteworthy limitation of our analysis is that the model does not capture distortions 
from  taxes  on  capital  income.  In  this  regard  we  mischaracterize,  though  perhaps  only 
moderately, the efficiency gains from, and the incidence of, proportional cuts in marginal income 
taxes.  More  generally,  incorporating  taxes  on  capital  income  would  admit  a  wider  range  of 
possibilities  for  changes  in  the  taxation  of  personal  and  corporate  income  in  response  to 
recycling revenue from allowance sales. 
 
B. Formulas for Efficiency Costs and Distributional Burdens of Carbon Policies 
Here we go straight to the main formulas of interest. These are general expressions for 
the components of the efficiency costs and distributional burdens of carbon policies, and how 
those components vary under the allocation/recycling options just described. The formulas below 
are (reasonable) approximations given the scale of emission reductions considered and would be 
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9 This is similar to the approach taken in Williams (2009a and 2009b) when considering a distribution-neutralizing 
tax change in other policy contexts, but while those papers assume a continuous income distribution, this paper 
works with a discrete distribution made up of five quintiles. The approach in those papers in turn draws on earlier 
work by Kaplow (2004). 
 
10 Alternatively, we could assume that indirect revenue losses are deducted from the amount of revenue returned in 
transfers under cap-and-trade, or the size of the allowance giveaway under grandfathered permits, with significant 
implications for distributional incidence. However, our assumption is more in keeping with actual policy proposals 
(not least, given the difficulty of accurately projecting indirect revenue losses). 10 
exact  if  demand  and  marginal  abatement  cost  curves  were  linear  over  the  relevant  range. 
Derivations for the formulas are provided in the Appendix. 
 
(i) Efficiency costs. The (approximate) efficiency cost of a carbon policy that reduces aggregate 
CO2  emissions  by  an  amount!Z = Z
0 " Z ,  with  associated  emissions  price  τ,  can  be 
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  Beginning with (10b), !i
t ,  !i
p , and !i
I  denote three different taxable income elasticities 
for household i defined with respect to changes in marginal tax rates, changes in the general 
price  level,  and  changes  in  (taxable)  household  income,  respectively.  !i
" is  the  share  of 
household group i’s taxable income in economy-wide income.  
MEB is the marginal excess burden of taxation, the efficiency cost of raising an extra 
dollar of revenue through a proportionate increase in marginal income taxes. The numerator of 
MEB is the efficiency loss from an incremental increase in the marginal income tax for group i, 
aggregated  over  all  households.  The  efficiency  loss  for  group  i  is  the  induced  reduction  in 
taxable  income  (reflecting  both  reductions  in  labor  supply  and  increases  in  tax-preferred 
spending) times the marginal tax rate. The denominator of the MEB is the extra revenue from the 
tax increase, summed over all households. Alternatively, the MEB can be expressed as a function 11 
of  the  weighted  sum  of  taxable  income  elasticities  (with  respect  to  tax  rates)  for  different 
household groups, with weights equal to the households’ share in economy-wide taxable income. 
Note that, according to the way we have defined it in (10b), behavioral responses underlying the 
MEB are uncompensated. 
In equation (10a), the first component of the welfare cost,  WC
HT , corresponds to the 
Harberger  triangle  under  the  economy-wide  marginal  abatement  cost  curve.  This  curve 
represents the envelope of other marginal abatement cost curves for each margin of behavior for 
reducing  emissions—reducing  emissions  per  unit  of,  and  reducing  overall  consumption  of, 
energy-intensive products.
11 The Harberger triangle is the same under all four policy scenarios. 
The  second  component  in  (10a),  WG
RR,  termed  the  revenue-recycling  effect  (e.g., 
Goulder 1995), is the efficiency gain that results to the extent that revenues are used to reduce 
marginal income taxes. This component is the product of the MEB and the amount of revenue 
recycled in this fashion, where the latter is the policy rents retained by the government less what 
is spent on transfer payments and indexing.  
The third welfare cost component, WC
TI, is the tax-interaction effect. In most prior work 
this referred to the welfare loss from the reduction in labor supply as policy-induced increases in 
the general price level reduced the real return to work effort (e.g., Goulder 1995). The welfare 
loss was the change in labor earnings, multiplied by the labor tax distortion, and multiplied by 
1+MEB, as lost labor tax revenues must be made up through higher (distortionary) taxes to 
maintain budget balance. In these models, the change in labor earnings depends on both the 
responsiveness of labor supply to higher prices, and the loss of worker surplus from the price 
increase. The latter is (approximately) equal to allowance rent plus the Harberger triangle under 
the marginal abatement cost curve, and corresponds to !(Z + "Z / 2) in our formula for WC
TI. 
However, in our case the tax-interaction effect is measured with respect to changes in taxable 
income, in response to higher product prices, rather than labor earnings, and hence it is the 
taxable  income,  rather  than  labor  supply,  elasticity  that  appears  in  our  formula.  The  tax-
interaction effect (as defined here) is also constant across different policies. 
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11 These marginal cost curves all come out of the origin given that our model abstracts from other distortions 
affecting the production and use of energy, such as fuel taxes, automobile congestion, and non-competitive pricing 
of electricity. 
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Our expression for WC
TI embeds a number of simplifying assumptions that might, to 
some degree, be open to question (see the Appendix). One is that we assume all goods are equal 
substitutes for leisure and therefore not deserving of any Ramsey tax or subsidy from an optimal 
tax perspective. In the absence of evidence to the contrary however, this seems a reasonable, 
neutral assumption. Another simplification is that compliance costs are fully passed forward into 
higher prices. To the extent, for example, that compliance costs come at the expense of infra-
marginal rent earned on base load power generation, the price effect and tax-interaction effect 
will be weaker.
12 In short, the reader should bear in mind that the absolute value of the tax-
interaction  effect  is  difficult  to  pin  down  accurately,  though  this  is  not  relevant  for  the 
cost/distributional tradeoffs involved in allocating cap-and-trade rents, which is the main focus 
of our paper. 
The final component of welfare cost, WC
INC, reflects efficiency losses from the reduction 
in taxable income in response to higher lump-sum income—through higher government transfers 
and/or profit income. This largely reflects a reduction in labor supply as households take more 
leisure, which is a normal good. 
 
(ii)  Distributional  burden.  The  distributional  burden  of  the  emissions  pricing  policy  on 
household group i, relative to income, is fairly straightforward and can be approximated by (see 














The  first terms  reflects  the (first  order)  consumer  surplus  loss  from  the induced  increase  in 
energy  prices.  The  second  term  picks  up  possible  benefits  from  dividends  and  rent  income 
through stock ownership under grandfathered permits. And the third term reflects gains from 
reductions in marginal tax rates. The efficiency consequences from the revenue-recycling, tax-
interaction, and income effect on labor supply are all included in the distributional analysis, 
through overall changes in marginal income tax rates, in the third term. We omit the Harberger 
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12 T h e  p r i c e  p a s s  t h r o u g h  m a y  a l s o  b e  i m p e r f e c t  i n  s t a t e s  t h a t  r e t a i n  c o s t -of-service  regulation  for  power 
generation—in this case, utilities receiving free allowance allocations cannot pass forward the opportunity cost of 
such allowances in higher generation prices. See Parry (2005) for more discussion of these issues. 
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triangle from the distributional analysis, as this is small relative to the first order loss of surplus 
to households from higher energy prices. 
 
3. Parameterization of the Model 
Our baseline parameter assumptions are summarized in Table 1. We focus on projections 
for year 2020. All monetary figures are expressed in year 2008 dollars (or thereabouts).  
Income  distribution.  To  obtain  the  income  distribution  we  use  data  from  the  Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CEX) for years 2007 and 2008, for households that completed their year in 
the survey panel during 2008.
13 As is standard in incidence analysis we divide households into 
quintiles in two different ways: based on their pre-tax annual income and based on their total 
consumption.
14 To the extent that households are able to smooth consumption over time, the 
consumption-based  measure  will  more  accurately  reflect  lifetime  income.  Distributional 
differences  are  more  muted  when  measured  based  on  consumption  quintiles  than  based  on 
income quintiles.  
Under either measure, quintile 1 is the lowest 20 percent of income earners, quintile 2 the 
next  lowest  20  percent,  and  so  on.  For  simplicity,  we  assume  the  real  income  and  real 
consumption of each household group grows at the same 1.5 percent annual rate out to 2020. In 
2020, income per household varies from $11,307 for the lowest income quintile to $181,626 for 
the top quintile, and consumption varies from $19,253 for the lowest consumption quintile to 
$126,173 for the highest (Table 1). 
 
Budget  shares  for  energy-intensive  goods.  In  the  analytical  model,  goods  are  either  energy-
intensive or non-energy intensive. In the real world and in the data, goods vary widely in their 
energy (and thus carbon) intensity. One could simply divide goods into energy-intensive and 
non-energy-intensive categories and assign all energy-intensive goods the same embodied carbon 
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13 The CEX uses a rotating panel design: each calendar quarter, one fourth of the households in the sample are 
rotated out, so each household appears in the data for four quarters. To obtain a full year of data on each household 
that completed its time in the panel during 2008 therefore requires using data from both 2007 and 2008. 
 
14 Because income in the CEX is known to be poorly measured for low-income households, it is customary for 
incidence studies to drop some very low-income households to minimize the effects of that measurement problem. 
We follow the same approach as Grainger and Kolstad (2010), dropping households with reported income below 
$7,500,  but  not  altering  the  quintile  cutoff  levels  of  income  and  expenditure  as  a  result  of  dropping  those 
households. 14 
content and all non-energy-intensive goods a lower or zero embodied carbon content. But given 
the wide variation in embodied carbon across goods, this could introduce substantial inaccuracy 
when measuring the distributional burden of a carbon tax. 
  Instead, we estimate the total carbon embodied in all of the goods a household consumes, 
and then define the consumption of energy-intensive goods in the model to be proportional to 
that total. In effect, this treats consuming a particular good from the CEX as consuming some of 
the  energy-intensive  good  and  some  of  the  non-energy-intensive  good,  with  the  relative 
proportions  being  determined  by  the  embodied  carbon  content  of  that  good.  We  take  the 
estimates of embodied carbon for goods in the CEX from Hassett et al. (2007), who calculate 
those estimates based on input-output tables from the US Bureau of Economic Analysis. 
 
Stock ownership. We calculate stock ownership by aggregating for each quintile the value of 
estimated market value of all stocks, bonds, mutual funds, and other such securities reported by 
each household in the CEX. According to this calculation, the top-income quintile owned 59.8 
percent of stockholdings, while the lowest income quintile owned 2.6 percent. Stock ownership 
shares are assumed to be the same in 2020 as in 2007-08.
15  
 
Household tax rates and transfers. Marginal and average rates of federal and state income taxes 
(accounting for the earned income tax credit and child tax credits), and sales taxes, were obtained 
by running each household from the CEX data for 1997-1999 through the NBER’s TAXSIM 
model, using the tax laws for those years, and then aggregating for each quintile.
16 We add to 
these  employer  and  employee  payroll  taxes  (based  on  statutory  rates)  to  obtain  the  overall 
income tax rates (assumed to apply in 2020) shown in Table 1. Marginal tax rates vary from 0.17 
for the bottom income quintile to 0.41 for the top income quintile and average (weighted by 
taxable income) 0.40.  
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15 Ideally, we would use information on the pattern of stock ownership across energy-intensive firms (rather than all 
firms) to gauge the distribution of rent income under grandfathered permits. However, this is difficult to obtain 
given that most stocks are owned indirectly through large investment firms. 
 
16 These years pre-date the federal income tax cuts of 2001 and 2003, and thus will approximate the taxes that will 
apply if those tax cuts are allowed to expire (which seems increasingly likely over time, given budgetary pressures). 
We feel this provides a better approximation to the tax laws in 2020 than would using the 2008 tax laws. To the 
extent that this over- or underestimates marginal tax rates in 2020, the magnitudes of the revenue-recycling and tax-
interaction effects will also be over- or underestimated. 
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Taxable  income  elasticities.  During  the  last  decade,  a  substantial  number  of  papers  have 
estimated the elasticity of taxable income with respect to tax rates, both for the economy as a 
whole, and for high-income taxpayers. Although initial estimates of this elasticity were quite 
large (e.g., Feldstein 1999), more recent estimates are considerably smaller, in part reflecting 
better data and improved methods of controlling for non-tax factors affecting changes in taxable 
income. Based on a careful review of evidence for the United States and other countries, Saez et 
al. (2009) put the taxable income elasticity (for the economy as a whole) at 0.12 to 0.40, with 
more estimates closer to the top end of this range than the bottom.
17  
Although  we  assume  that  all  taxpayers  have  the  same  labor  supply  elasticity,  higher 
income taxpayers tend to have more scope for exploiting tax preferences, so they tend to have 
higher taxable income elasticities. We assume taxable income elasticities with respect to tax rates 
vary between 0.2 for the low income quintile and 0.35 for the top income quintile, as shown in 
Table 1, where (weighting by household shares in taxable income) the average elasticity is 0.31. 
 An increase in the general price level (in response to carbon policy) has a comparable 
effect on labor supply to a reduction in the real household wage—that is, households substitute 
leisure for work, though this is partly offset by an income effect in the opposite direction. The 
effect on tax-preferred spending should be small since the price of ordinary spending does not 
change relative to the price of tax-favored spending.
18 For the same reason, the change in taxable 
income  in  response  to  higher  lump-sum  payments  should  be  similar  to  the  change  in  labor 
earnings. We therefore use standard values for the uncompensated labor supply elasticity, and 
income elasticity of labor supply, namely 0.15 and -0.2 (e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy, 1999), as 
proxies for !i
p  and !i
I for all households. 
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17 One caveat here is that there is a slight mismatch between our representation of the taxable income elasticity and 
empirical estimates of that elasticity. In our model, this elasticity reflects tax-induced reductions in labor supply and 
shifting to tax-preferred consumption, whereas empirical studies summarize a broader range of responses including 
shifting to tax-sheltered saving. This mismatch (which we believe is not too important for our purposes) is due to 
our characterizing the income tax system as a tax on labor alone, rather than a tax on both labor and capital income. 
 
18 That is, although tax-preferred spending will fall in response to higher energy prices the resulting efficiency gain 
(due to offsetting the tax subsidy) is modest relative to the efficiency loss from the reduction in labor supply. This is 
because the “market” for tax-preferred spending is small (about 10-15 percent) relative to the labor market. 
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Emissions  reductions  and  prices.  These  are  based  on  a  policy  simulation  of  representative 
climate  bills  reported  in  Krupnick  et  al.  (2010)  using  a  variant  of  the  Energy  Information 
Administration’s National Energy Modeling System (NEMS). NEMS is a dynamic, economic-
engineering model of the economy, with considerable detail on a wide spectrum of existing and 
emerging technologies across the energy system. Its projections are widely used by other energy 
modeling groups. 
Without climate policy, this model projects CO2 emissions to be about 6 billion metric 
tons in 2020. The electricity and transport sectors account for about 40 and 33 percent of these 
emissions  respectively,  and  other  sources  (i.e., non  electricity  emissions  from  the  industrial, 
commercial, and residential sectors) account for the remaining 27 percent. With climate policy, 
energy-related CO2 emissions are reduced by about 9 percent below business-as-usual levels in 
2020, or by 0.54 billion tons, and the allowance price is $33 per ton of CO2 in current dollars 
(Krupnick et al. 2010).
19 Thus, the Harberger triangle, WC
HT, is about $9 billion and policy rents, 
τZ, are about $180 billion. The carbon policy increases energy prices in our model by 7.9 percent 
or the general price level by 0.5 percent. 
 
4. Results 
A. Cost Comparison 
Figure 1 shows the overall cost of imposing a carbon policy with an allowance price of 
$33 per ton of CO2, under each of the four options for the use of allowance rents: a proportional 
income  tax  cut,  lump  sum  rebates  to  households,  free  allocation  of  permits  to  firms,  and  a 
distribution-neutralizing  tax  cut.  For  this  last  option,  the  cost  varies  substantially  based  on 
whether  the  tax  cut  neutralizes  distributional  effects  across  income  quintiles  or  across 
consumption quintiles, so these are presented separately. Note that Figure 1 provides just an 
estimate of policy costs: it does not incorporate any estimates of the climate benefits from lower 
CO2 emissions. 
  For each case, the figure also shows the four components of welfare cost: the Harberger 
triangle term (the partial-equilibrium cost, ignoring any interactions with the tax system); the 
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19 This policy run involves a more aggressive emission reduction target, but allows domestic and international 
offsets (under an intermediate assumption about the availability of such offsets). Here we assume that the same 
emissions price projected by this run is imposed, but is applied only to CO2 with no offsets. In either case, the 
reduction in domestic, energy-related CO2 should be essentially the same.  17 
revenue-recycling effect (the gain from using allowance rents to finance tax rate cuts); the tax-
interaction effect (the general-equilibrium loss resulting when higher energy prices discourage 
labor supply); and the income effect on labor supply (a further general-equilibrium loss as the 
income  effect  from  the  distribution  of  policy  rents  further  discourages  labor  supply).  The 
Harberger triangle is the same across all the policy simulations ($8.9 billion a year in 2020) as is 
the tax-interaction effect ($25.0 billion). However, the revenue-recycling effect, in particular, 
differs across policies, as does the income effect on labor supply. 
  When allowance rents are used to finance a proportional income tax cut, the overall cost 
of the policy is -$6.4 billion/year. This case yields a “strong” double dividend (Goulder, 1995): 
even ignoring the benefits of reduced carbon emissions, the cost of the policy is still negative. As 
discussed in Parry and Bento (2000), when certain categories of spending are tax-favored, the 
gains  from  the  revenue-recycling  effect  are  magnified  (relative  to  a  case  without  such  tax 
preferences), but the losses from the tax-interaction effect are approximately unaffected. As a 
result, the revenue-recycling effect (a gain of $41.3 billion) exceeds the tax-interaction effect, 
and by enough to more than offset the Harberger triangle. This qualitative result is different than 
in earlier literature that focused only on the labor market distortion caused by the tax system 
(e.g., Goulder, 1995). In the latter models, the revenue-recycling effect typically falls short of the 
tax-interaction effect and the overall costs of auctioned cap-and-trade systems (or carbon taxes) 
is positive, and exceeds the Harberger triangle.
20 
  The welfare cost of the cap-and-trade policy is much higher under either the cap-and-
dividend or free permit allocation cases: under each of these options the cost is roughly $50 
billion a year in 2020. By giving away the permit rents, these two options give up the large gain 
from the revenue-recycling effect ($41.3 billion). In addition they produce a smaller, but still 
significant,  loss  of  $6.4  billion  (under  cap-and-dividend)  or  $11.6  billion  per  year  (under 
grandfathered  permits)  because  the  resulting  lump-sum  income  to  households  reduces  labor 
supply. This effect is stronger for the grandfathered permit case as higher income households—
who face higher marginal income tax rates—receive a disproportionately larger share of the 
policy rents in this case. The overall welfare cost of the cap-and-dividend and grandfathered 
permit polices is over five times the Harberger triangle, underscoring the bias in cost analyses 
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20 Similarly, if tax preferences were entirely justified by market failures then the revenue-recycling effect would be 
smaller. In this case, the overall cost of our proportional tax cut case would be positive (roughly $15 billion). 
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that omit interactions with the broader tax system.
21 Dividing total costs by the CO2 reduction 
(0.54 billion tons) the average cost per ton reduced is around $90 under cap-and-trade, compared 
with minus $12 in the proportional tax reduction case. 
Inflation-indexing  of  taxes  and  transfers  in  the  above  policy  cases  requires  revenue 
outlays of $30 billion/year in 2020, or one-sixth of the policy rents. The implied increase in 
marginal tax rates to cover this revenue loss adds $7.4 billion/year to overall welfare costs. In the 
proportional income tax case this cost leads to a smaller overall gain from the revenue-recycling 
effect, while in the grandfathered permit and cap-and-dividend cases (which give away the entire 
$180 billion of policy rents) it is reflected in a negative revenue-recycling effect.
22  
  The  overall  cost  of  the  distribution-neutral  options  fall  between  the  cost  under  the 
proportional tax cut and the cost under the cap-and-dividend policy—welfare costs are $9.9 and 
$22.6 billion in the consumption-based and annual income-based cases for measuring inequality, 
respectively. The distribution-neutralizing tax change lowers tax rates rather than providing a 
lump-sum transfer, so it generates a gain from the revenue-recycling effect, which causes the 
overall  cost  to  be  substantially  lower  than  the  overall  cost  under  the  cap-and-dividend  and 
grandfathered permits. However, because the tax cuts are larger for lower-income households (to 
offset the regressive incidence of higher energy prices), the marginal tax rate reductions and 
corresponding efficiency gains from revenue recycling are smaller than in the proportional tax 
cut case. This effect is even more pronounced when inequality is measured using annual income 
rather than consumption. In the former case, higher energy prices are more regressive, requiring 
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21 These results implicitly assume that none of the permit rents are taxed under either policy option. This is very 
likely to be true in the cap-and-dividend case. However, in the free permit allocation case, the permit rents could 
well be taxed, at least in part. To the extent that these rents accrue to stocks held in taxable accounts (as opposed to 
retirement or other tax-sheltered accounts), they will be subject to tax. Under either policy option, if the rents are 
taxed, then the overall cost will be a linear combination of the cost under that policy option (which assumes that 
none of the rents are taxed) and the cost under the proportional tax cut (which is equivalent to a case in which all of 
the permit rents are taxed at a rate of 100 percent). 
 
22 Note that because the tax system is indexed such that tax rates depend on real income, the overall results – both 
for efficiency and distribution – do not depend on the particular normalization used for prices (i.e., the choice of 
numeraire). However, the decomposition of those results into “inflation indexing” and other components does 
depend on the price normalization. We use a price normalization that holds the pre-tax wage constant, so a rise in 
the price of consumer goods relative to labor shows up as an increase in the overall price level, which produces the 
“inflation indexing” results shown here. If instead we were to use a normalization that holds the price of consumer 
goods constant, that same relative price change would show up as a reduction in the pre-tax wage. In this case, there 
would be no revenue cost for inflation indexing, but instead there would be a reduction in income tax revenue 
resulting from the lower wages. Thus, the overall effect would be the same, but the decomposition of that effect 
between “inflation indexing” and other effects on revenue would differ. 
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an even greater concentration of tax cuts among lower income households. Thus, the revenue-
recycling gains are $15.8 billion in this case, compared with $25.7 billion when inequality is 
measured using the consumption approach.  
   
B. Distributional Effects  
  Figures 2 and 3  summarize the distributional burdens of the different policies across 
income  quintiles,  based  on  income  and  consumption  quintiles,  respectively.  Burdens  are 
expressed as a percent of household income. In addition, the net burden is decomposed into the 
burden of the higher energy prices caused by the cap-and-trade program; the gain to households 
resulting from inflation-indexing of the tax and transfer system; any gain from reductions in 
marginal income tax rates; and possible gains from permit rents or lump-sum dividends.
23  
  All policies impose the same pattern of burdens across households due to higher energy 
prices.  This  burden  component falls  with  income—for  example,  the  bottom  quintile  bears  a 
burden of 6.0 percent when inequality is measured on an income basis, falling steadily to 1.2 
percent for the top quintile. Lower income groups spend a greater fraction of their income on 
energy-intensive consumption. One reason for this is that energy-intensive goods make up a 
slightly larger share of spending for lower-income households. Another is that lower-income 
households spend a larger fraction of their income due to lower or even negative saving rates (on 
average  lower  income  households  spend  more  than  their  income).  Dividing  households  into 
consumption quintiles rather than income quintiles greatly reduces this second effect, and hence 
the distributional burden is considerably less regressive when measured based on consumption 
quintiles. In this case, the bottom quintile bears a burden of 3.3 percent while the top quintile 
bears a burden of 1.5 percent.  
  Inflation-indexing of the tax and transfer system provides an automatic offset for part of 
the burden of the policy and again the pattern of this gain across households is the same across 
policy  scenarios.  As  the  prices  of  energy-intensive  goods  rise,  inflation-indexing  causes  an 
increase in transfers (or decrease in taxes paid, for indexing of tax brackets and other elements of 
the tax system). Averaged across all households, the benefit from inflation indexing is about 0.3 
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23 The results discussed below are broadly consistent with those in Burtraw et al. (2009) who look at the 
incidence  of  federal  cap-and-trade  policies  under  alternative  revenue  uses  using  a  model  with 
considerable disaggregation by households and region.  20 
percent of income, or about one-seventh of the average burden from higher energy prices (1.9 
percent). The portion of the burden of energy prices offset by inflation indexing varies relatively 
little across income quintiles—for example, it offsets roughly one-seventh of the burden for the 
bottom quintile, about one-fifth for the middle, and one-eleventh for the top quintile.
24 
  For the proportional income tax case (Figures 2a and 3a), by definition the gains from the 
tax cut are the same for each quintile, roughly 1.7 percent of income for each group. The overall 
net burden under this policy as a percentage of income is highest for the bottom quintile and falls 
steadily as one moves up the income distribution, given that revenue-recycling does nothing to 
offset the regressive effect of higher energy prices. For income-based quintiles the net burden 
varies between 3.5 and minus 0.6 percent across the lowest and highest quintiles, while for 
consumption-based quintiles it varies from 1.2 to minus 0.3 percent.  
  For  the  cap-and-dividend  policy  (Figures  2b  and  3b)  the  distribution  of  the  policy 
dividend is highly progressive, given that all households receive the same absolute cash rebate. 
As a result, even though the overall cost of this policy is much higher than in the proportional 
income tax cut case, the bottom three quintiles experience smaller net burdens under cap-and-
dividend. In fact, the bottom two quintiles actually have a negative net burden (under either 
income- or consumption-based quintiles). This illustrates the stark tradeoff between efficiency 
and distribution: lower-income groups are much better off under cap-and-dividend than they are 
under a proportional income tax cut, but the overall welfare cost of the policy is dramatically 
higher. 
  The policy with free allowance allocation to firms (Figures 2c and 3c) does nothing to 
offset the regressive effect of higher energy prices—in fact the distribution of rent income is 
itself regressive, for the most part, given that for better off households capital is typically a larger 
share of their income. Comparing this case to either the proportional income tax cut or the cap-
and-dividend  case  reveals  no  tradeoff  between  efficiency  and  distribution.  Freely  allocating 
permits to firms results in a similarly regressive distribution of net burden to the proportional 
income tax case, but a much higher overall cost because it fails to exploit the revenue-recycling 
effect. In fact, every income quintile is better off under the proportional income tax cut than 
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24 For reasons analogous to those discussed in footnote 22, above, the net burden on each quintile is independent of 
the choice of price normalization. But the decomposition of that net burden into “inflation indexing” and other 
components does depend on the normalization. 21 
under free permits. Conversely, the cap-and-dividend case results in a much more progressive 
distribution of net burdens than free permits, but has a similar (even slightly lower) overall cost.  
  Under the distribution-neutralizing change (Figures 2d and 3d) the tax change is designed 
to be sufficiently progressive to exactly offset the regressive burden of higher energy prices, thus 
making the distribution of the net burden of the policy proportional to income. This case falls 
between the proportional tax cut and cap-and-dividend cases, in terms of both efficiency and 
distribution: the overall cost is lower than under cap-and-dividend but higher than under the 
proportional  tax  cut,  and  the  distribution  of  burden  is  less  progressive  than  under  cap-and-
dividend but less regressive than under the proportional tax cut.  
    
5. Conclusions 
  The allocation and use of rents created under cap-and-trade programs (or revenues under 
an emissions tax) can hugely affect the overall efficiency and distributional effects of carbon 
policy. Within the range of options we consider for the use of revenue, in a case where the direct 
cost of the carbon restriction itself is $9 billion/year in 2020, the overall welfare cost of the 
policy ranges from negative $6 billion/year to $53 billion/year. And the distribution of that cost 
ranges from highly progressive (with the bottom two income quintiles bearing a negative burden) 
to highly regressive (with the top two quintiles bearing a negative burden). 
  In general, there is a clear tradeoff between efficiency and distribution. Using policy 
revenues to fund cuts in marginal income tax rates is highly efficient, but leads to a regressive 
distribution of the net burden. At the other end of the range, the cap-and-dividend approach has a 
far  higher  overall  cost,  but  leads  to  a  highly  progressive  distribution.  And  a  distribution-
neutralizing tax change represents a middle ground for both efficiency and distributional effects. 
  This  tradeoff  does  not  hold  for  free  permit  allocation  to  firms  in  affected  industries, 
which has both a high overall cost and regressive distribution of that cost. But this can be viewed 
as  an  efficiency-distribution  tradeoff  along  a  different  dimension,  addressing  distributional 
concerns across firms in different industries rather than across households in different income 
groups. Thus, while this type of allocation is both inefficient and regressive, it may have more 
political traction.  
  More  generally,  our  discussion  underscores  that  the  case  for  cap-and-trade  without 
revenue recycling is more fragile than generally realized (at least for medium term levels of 22 
emissions controls envisioned in recent climate bills). Our calculations imply the average cost of 
reducing domestic, energy-related CO2 when policy rents are not used to cut distortionary taxes 
is around $90 per ton—far above most estimates of the benefits per ton of CO2 reductions (e.g., 
Aldy et al., 2010, US IAWG, 2010).
25 In contrast, the average cost is negative $12 per ton when 
efficiency gains from the revenue-recycling effect are fully exploited (without even including 
any climate benefits). In our compromise cases where the carbon policy is neither regressive nor 
progressive the average cost per ton reduced is $18 to $42. 
  Given these tradeoffs, and the potentially huge  consequences for both efficiency  and 
distribution, more attention should be paid to the use of revenue when analyzing carbon policy. 
And future research on creative policy designs that balance efficiency, distribution, and political 
feasibility could be highly valuable. 
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25 Nonetheless, there are many arguments for moving ahead with a cap-and-trade program, even if it fails a narrowly 
defined cost-benefit test in the early years. For example, the benefit to cost ratio could easily become favorable over 
time as the policy is tightened and a greater share of policy rents are used in efficiency-enhancing ways; putting a 
price on carbon could have important long run benefits in terms of encouraging clean technology development; and 
action by the United States on climate policy could help to spur similar programs in other countries.  23 
Appendix: Analytical Derivations 
Deriving equation (10) 
We follow the usual two-step procedure for obtaining the marginal welfare effects of 
policy changes. First we solve the household’s optimization problem. Then we obtain the welfare 
effects of a marginal change in the emissions price by totally differentiating the household’s 
indirect utility, accounting for the household’s behavior, and changes in prices, taxes, and lump-
sum income. Finally, we integrate over marginal welfare effects to obtain the effects of non-
marginal policy changes. 
 
Household Optimization. From (1)-(3), the optimization problem for household group i is given 
by: 
(A1)  Vi(pE, pF, pC,ti,Gi,!i)= 
 
Max
XiE , XiF , XiC ,Li
! ui(XiE,XiF,XiC,Li,G
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where Vi(.) denotes the indirect utility function and λi is the marginal utility of income. Using the 
definition of taxable income in (3a), this optimization yields the first order conditions, demand, 
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  Xij = Xij(pE, pF, pC,ti),  Li = Li(pE, pF, pC,ti)  
To  manipulate  the  analytical  derivations  below,  we  obtain  the  following  additional 
expressions by totally differentiating the expression in (A1) with respect to arguments of the 
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Welfare Effects of Marginal Policy Changes 
Aggregate welfare is given by the sum of individual utilities, Vi
i ! . Totally differentiating 
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Next, we discuss expressions for some of the individual terms in (A4).  








However the first term cancels, assuming that firms equate marginal abatement costs  ! c  to the 
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Now we totally differentiate the government budget constraint in (8) with respect to τ, holding 
G
PUB constant but allowing ti and Gi to vary, wheredti / d! = dt / d! . This gives, after expressing 
changes in Z as a total differential: 
(A9) 
dGi

























From the definition of the marginal excess burden in (10b): 












Substituting (A10) in (A9), multiplying through by 1+MEB and subtracting  !i
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  Finally, from differentiating (7) with respect to τ, and using (A3), the last term in (A4) 
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where we have used !i =1
i " . 
  Substituting  (A7), (A8),  (A11)  and  (A12)  in  (A4),  and  expressing  utility  losses  as  a 
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Welfare Effects of Non-Marginal Policy Changes 









Again, given dZ / d!  is constant,!(dZ / d")" = Z0 ! Z . Hence we obtain WC
HT in (10a). 
 
  We take the MEB as constant over the relevant range, which is reasonable given that 
proportional changes in income tax rates are relatively small. Integrating marginal emissions tax 
revenue  (1!")(Z +# $dZ / d#) over an emissions tax rising from 0 to τ simply gives revenue 
raised by the tax,(1!")#Z . And integrating the marginal change in the transfer payment for 
household  group  i  over  the  tax  increase  simply  gives  the  total  change  in  transfer 
paymentGi ! Gi
0 = "Gi . Hence we obtain WC
RR in (10a). 
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  From the third component of (A13),!"i / !# = (!"i / !p)(!p / !#). Taking a small change 
in the emissions price this expression becomes(!"i / !p)#p. Hence we obtain the first expression 
for WC
TI in (10a). 
 
  Substituting expressions for !i
p and !i
T  from (10b), gives: 
 
(A15)  WC




i $  
 
where  the  general  price  level  is  normalized  to  unity.  The  burden  of  the  emissions  price 
!(Z + "Z / 2)is  fully  passed  forward  into  higher  product  prices, 
therefore!p = "(Z + !Z / 2)/ Xij
ij # . Making this substitution and  Xij
ij ! = Ii
i !  in (A15) gives 
the second expression for WC
TI in (10a). 
 
  Finally, again if we approximate by taking ti and !"i / !Gi  as constant over the relevant 
range, then integrating over the last term in (A13) gives 
 







Substituting out  !"i / !Gi = !"i / !Ii using the taxable income elasticity with respect to income 
in (10b), gives the last expression WC
INC in (10a).  
 
 
Deriving equation (11) 
Equation  (11)  comes  from  the  effect  on  utility  from  small  changes  in  each  of  the 
arguments of Vi(.) in equation (A1), after substituting (A3), and dividing by!iIi. 27 
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Figure 2. Decomposition of Net Burden by Income Quintile under Alternative Policies 
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Figure 3. Decomposition of Net Burden by Consumption Quintile under Alternative 
Policies 
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